Instrumental Music and Individual Congregations
Rev. John M’Ewan was minister of John Knox Free Church in Edinburgh. In 1883, concerned about attempts to introduce instrumental music into the public worship of the Free Church of Scotland, he authored a pamphlet in which he listed several arguments against the introduction. George Smeaton provided a preface, and after summarising the historical practice in Scotland, he wrote: ‘With these views I fully concur, and deeply would I deplore the disturbance of the unity, peace and spiritual prosperity of the Church, by the introduction of new elements in worship, which are not in keeping with the genius of Scottish Presbyterianism.’ One of the arguments discussed by M’Ewan was the claim that each congregation in a Presbyterian church has liberty to decide for itself the elements of public worship.
Now, one of the leading features in our Presbyterian Constitution is that which refers to uniformity as well as purity of worship. All Free Church office-bearers, as we have seen, are bound, on their admission to office, to maintain, observe, and defend the purity of worship as presently practised in this Church. When, therefore, a congregation asks permission to change the character of that worship, they should be reminded that they are simply asking that the Free Church should change her constitution, in so far as uniformity of worship is concerned, and adopt the theory of Independency, and that the request cannot be granted without the abandonment of one of her fundamental principles. When we speak of uniformity, we do not mean absolute uniformity in every minute detail. This is not possible, and has never been demanded; but uniformity is demanded in so far as the great outstanding features of that Presbyterianism is concerned, which has been practised for three hundred years. To introduce into such a worship instrumental music, and still profess to maintain the uniformity of worship as presently practised in this Church, appears to us a gross delusion and an abuse of language. Besides, the theory of Presbyterianism is, that in the constant fluctuation that is ever going on in a population like ours, our people should find, in going from one place to another, and from one church to another, the same form of worship in substance, to that with which they have been accustomed. They have a right, as members of our Church, to expect this, and the Church has no right, unless she change her Constitution, to deprive them of this right, while even the Constitution itself cannot be changed, without the consent of those who are parties to the contract. It is on this ground, that all members of the Church have a right to object, when individual congregations claim liberty to introduce serious changes into the worship of the Church.
The late Dr. Candlish may surely be regarded as a highly competent authority on any question bearing on the Constitution of the Church, and on the question we are now discussing, here is his deliverance. After making the supposition that a Presbyterian Church might come to the conclusion that the question be left an open one, and that kirk-sessions and congregations should be allowed to exercise their discretion in regard to it, he adds: ‘It is manifest, however, that this is a conclusion which could satisfy none but those who either approve of instrumental music, or reckon it a matter of indifference. All who are conscientiously opposed to it – who regard it as inexpedient and unlawful, unauthorised, and unscriptural – must feel themselves bound, as Presbyterians, to do their utmost against a proposal to have it even tolerated. In their own judgment it is an act of will worship; and there is no plea of conscience on the other side to which they might be bound to let their own judgment defer.’ Again he says: ‘It is enough to say that it is inconsistent with Presbyterianism. Those Presbyterians who disapprove on conscientious and scriptural grounds of a particular mode of worship – as, for instance, of the organ – cannot divest themselves of responsibility by merely excluding it from their own congregations. They are bound to resist the introduction of it in all the congregations of the Church, as well as in their own.’ There is much more to the same purpose that might have been quoted. Surely Dr. Candlish knew the meaning of Presbyterianism.
But there is more to be said on this plea of congregational liberty. We are prepared to show that this liberty which they crave, if granted, would involve an interference with the just liberty of others. Let us suppose that the liberty to employ organs were granted, what would be the consequence? There are hundreds of ministers and thousands of the people in the Free Church who are opposed on conscientious and scriptural grounds, to the use of instrumental music in public worship. See how it would bear on these people, in the first place, and on ministers, in the second place.
In the event of these people coming to, or dwelling in, large cities or towns, they might in that case find some church where they could worship God in comfort according to the good old way; but suppose they come to live, or happen to reside in a rural parish or small town where there is only one Free Church, and where the proposed innovation has been adopted; what are such persons to do? Are they to leave the Free Church, and that, perhaps, when other Presbyterian Churches are equally guilty of a departure from the old established forms of worship? Or are they to attend a church where their conscientious convictions of what is right in the sight of God are rudely trampled upon? This is a case of conscience of a most delicate kind. There is a peculiarity about this innovation which does not apply to others. Whatever attitude might be adopted by others, and whether I approved of it or not, would not deprive me following my own way, under a sense of duty, but the use of an organ would. Has any church a right so to change the form of worship, without either the plea of conscience or Scripture, as to place any of her members in such a position? We trow not. Here under the guise of the sacred name of liberty, the greatest interference would take place with the just liberty of others.
Then, secondly, the condition of ministers who are opposed to the proposed innovation would still be worse, and the same thing is true of licentiates of the Church. At present, in accordance with the law of the Church, all ministers and licentiates of the Church are eligible to be called to any vacant congregation, and any congregation in the Church has the right, when vacant, to call any such minister or licentiate. But grant the liberty craved, and let instrumental music be introduced: while the same liberty would theoretically remain, practically it would be gone. The congregation which had adopted the innovation, would be necessarily restricted, when vacant, to call only such ministers as were favourable to the innovation, as they would never dream of calling a man whose first step would be to silence the instrument; and thus practically, all ministers and probationers who on principle were opposed to the innovation, would be deprived of a right and privilege which they at present enjoy. Has the Church a right to pass an act which would involve such results as these?
But even this is not all. Suppose the innovation sanctioned and acted upon by several congregations, say in a Presbytery like Edinburgh or Glasgow, and the duty of officiating on certain occasions is laid upon a minister who objects on principle to the innovation, what is such a minister to do? He would probably refuse, and if the Presbytery resolved to insist on obedience, which, of course, they ought to do, if the command is a legitimate one, you would have the strange spectacle presented of a minister made the subject of discipline, and it may be of suspension from office, technically on the ground of contumacy, but in reality on the ground of standing by his ordination vows, which bind him to adhere and conform himself to the purity of worship so practised by the Church when these vows were undertaken. Has a church the right, I do not say to put such discipline as we have indicated in force, but has she the right to pass a law by which it could, by possibility, be put in force? Again we say No, without a change of the constitution. The problem, it will thus be seen, is not so beautifully simple as our friends suppose, when they innocently only ask for congregational liberty in this matter. It is a liberty which, if granted, would impose fetters and restrictions on those who, on grounds of conscience, cannot approve of the change. It would be far more honest and straightforward to give up our Presbyterianism and become Independents, where congregations, under responsibility to Christ alone, might regulate their own affairs.
